Acre Quiz : The Palestins people in that Movie - Priz $100.000.000

 The secrets of old Acre 

Palestins people in the Movie - Prize $100.000.000

http://tripeilat.blogspot.co.il/2015/07/100000000-find-palestins-in-movei-prize.html

The Palestins people in the Movie - Prize $100.265.259

http://tripeilat.blogspot.co.il/2015/07/palestines-lies-and-facts.html

Susya: a Palestinian lie financed by the Europeans

Everybody knows that the settlements beyond the Green Line receive extensive subsidies and incentives. For example, a small community south of Hebron receives wind turbines to produce free electricity, it gets free mobile homes, free air conditioners, free toilets, free water tanks, a free library, free agricultural sheds, a free mobile clinic and free health care, and even basic food items, completely for free. Oh yeah, and a free mosque.

Why a mosque? Because this settlement is an illegal Palestinian outpost, established in Israeli territory (Area C according to the Oslo Accord’s territorial division), and is located near the Jewish settlement of Susya in the southern Hebron hills. Who finances it? The EU, of course, but we'll get to them later.

After the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993, and especially since 2009, Palestinians began to establish outposts in Area C (which is under Israeli control), with massive European funding. The positioning of these outposts seems random, but it is planned: strategic locations designed to interrupt the continuity of Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria. This program is called the "Fayyad Plan", named after Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian official who conceived it. The Europeans, for their part, are joining the initiative as they consider Judea and Samaria occupied territory and are working to establish a Palestinian state in the entire territory.

Back to Susya: the Nawjah clan, which claims historical ownership of land near the Jewish settlement of Susya, refused an Israeli offer to move to the nearby town of Yatta. Its members decided to stay in the hills, get all the perks the Europeans give them, and build houses in Israeli territory, in contradiction of local planning and violation of the law.

Clashes with the adjacent Jewish settlement of Susya soon followed. They peaked in 2001, when Mohammed Noor murdered Yair Har-Sinai, a shepherd from Susya, who advocated pacifism and never carried a weapon. In accordance with a military injunction, the clan’s houses were destroyed. The killer was expelled from the grazing land but returned about a decade later due to pressure from left-wing organizations and the courts.

In 2011 the Arabs petitioned the Israeli High Court and demanded access to 3,000 dunams of the Jewish settlement. The High Court dismissed the petition, asking the petitioners why they were only waking up 30 years after the establishment of the (Jewish) community. A year later, the Jewish community petitioned the High Court, claiming that the Arabs had built a village and demanding its destruction. Although the High Court often side with the Arabs, this time it ordered the army to explain why it was not destroying the village and issuing an injunction that prohibits Palestinians from continuing to build. A freeze of the situation.

Since then villagers violated the order four times by building new buildings. This angered the court, which ordered the structures destroyed at once, without any right of appeal. From that moment, the villagers, backed by leftist NGOs, began a huge campaign against the demolition of buildings constructed against a court order. The campaign not only forgets the fact that the order only applies to some of the buildings in the village (the campaign speaks of the destruction of the entire village of Susya), and doesn’t mention that these houses were built during a court-ordered construction freeze. Of course it also refers to the destruction of homes "without giving residents an alternative", although they all have a home in Yatta. Moreover, the state decided to give them more property: state land close to Area A. The Palestinians not only rejected the generous offer, they also concealed it in their campaign.

US State Department Spokesman John Kirby referred on July 16 to the storm in Susya that has not yet erupted and said, "We are closely watching what is happening in the village Susya. We strongly urge the Israeli authorities to refrain from carrying out any demolitions in the village. Demolition of this Palestinian village or of parts of it, and evictions of Palestinians from their homes, would be harmful and provocative. Such actions have an impact beyond those individuals and families who are evicted."

This lie must be stopped. It is inconceivable that Arabs will run wild and build wherever they want, violate international agreements and court orders, only to have the whole world back them up and urge us to whitewash this crime.

Karni Eldad is a musician, married, and a mother of two, a resident of Tekoa (West Bank).

http://www.i24news.tv/en/opinion/79280-150722-susya-a-palestinian-lie-financed-by-the-europeans?utm_source=SIM&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Newsletter_20150730_en&utm_content=&utm_term=

http://www.canarymission.org/

The Canary Mission database was created to expose individuals and groups that are anti-Freedom, anti-American and anti-Semitic in order to protect the public and our democratic values.

The Role of the Palestinians in the BDS Campaign

A BDS campaign notice posted on the website of the BNC, the Palestinian BDS National Committee in Ramallah, which claims to lead the global BDS campaign (BNC website Bdsmovement.net, September 4, 2014).

Introduction: Main Findings^[1]

1.   This study examines theroleof Palestinian activists and networks in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip in the global BDS campaign being waged against Israel. The campaign, which originated with the first Durban Conference (2001), is being waged by anti-Israeli activists and networks around the globe, especially in the West. It is mainly waged by far left and extremist Islamic fringe groups.

2.   The objective of the campaignis to label Israel as an "apartheid" country and promote an international boycott of its institutions, leaders, economy and culture, and of Israel's supporters. Its final goal is to cause Israel to collapse, as the apartheid regime in South Africa collapsed. The campaign's organizers oppose any recognition of the State of Israel or negotiations with it, reject the two-state solution, emphasize the so-called "right of return" of the millions of Palestinian refugees to the territory of the State of Israel and seek to realize the vision of one state ruled by Palestinians.

3.   Palestinian activists and networks in Ramallah joined the BDS campaign in 2005, four years after the Durban conference. In November 2007 Palestinian activists established the BNC, the Palestinian BDS National Committee. The BNC is currently composed of 27 Palestinian NGOs, some of them with a foothold in Palestinian civil society, and some minoror virtual and without substance.

4.   The BNC is an active partner in the anti-Israeli BDS campaign. Its hard core is a small group of Palestinian activists with no significant clout in internal Palestinian politics, but well-connected to the Western activists and networks leading the global BDS campaign.Two prominent members of the BNC are anti-Israeli activists who were educated in the West and studied at leading universities in the United States and Great Britain. The leading Palestinian figure is Omar Barghouti, a silver-tongued anti-Israeli Palestinian propagandist who calls himself a "human rights activist." Over the years he has become a key figure in the BDS campaign in the West, especially the United States and Britain. Michael Deas, who studied at the London School of Economics, works alongside him. Today he is the BNC's representative in Europe and operates in Britain, the center of the campaign to delegitimize Israel, and is also active in Western European countries and EU institutions.

5.   The BNC pretends to lead the global BDS campaign, claiming it has massive Palestinian support. The conclusion of the ITIC's study is that neither is correct, and that the BNC's self-aggrandizement is part of its propaganda efforts to inflate its importanceand image beyond what they are in fact. Thus, in reality the Palestinian BNC does not lead the global BDS campaign, which is a basically decentralized collection of interconnected networks without a well-defined hierarchy. In the internal Palestinian arena, the BNC does not have a genuine foothold in either Palestinian politics or society, neither in the Palestinian Authority (PA)-administered territories nor in the Gaza Strip. The conclusion of the study is that the BNC's main importance, from BDS perspective, is in allegedly presenting the authentic "Palestinian face" of the campaign. That is important in the eyes of the anti-Israeli activists and networks around the globe that pretend to promote "the rights of the Palestinians."

6.   The PA and Fatah are not part ofthe BDS campaign, but regard it as an effective tool for exerting pressure on Israel. They wage an extensive anti-Israeli political campaign giving moral support to the global BDS campaign:

1)     In the past strong differences of opinion surfaced between Mahmoud Abbas,the PA chairman,and Omar Barghouti, the prominent Palestinian BDS figure. The campaign waged by the PA and Fatah includes Israeli goods imported into Judea and Samaria, the boycott of goods manufactured in Judea and Samaria, and encourages states and companies to label products originating in Judea and Samaria.

2)     At the same time the PA enables the BNC to operate from Ramallah, and on occasion uses the BDS campaign to support its own political, propaganda and legal campaign against Israel. The attempt to have Israel suspended from FIFA may indicatea drift in the PA's policies towards adopting BDS tactics (BDS campaign activists said they were disappointed by "FIFA's betrayal" [of the PA] but claimed they were certain the effort to isolate Israel around the globe would continue).

7.   BNC and BDS activists around the globe often boast of the campaign's many successes. An examination of the campaign so far indicates a significant discrepancy between its actual results and the formidable image its activists try to create for it:

1)     In practical terms, despite localized successes, so far the BDS campaign, especially in the West, has not isolated Israel or significantly damaged its institutions, economy or culture. The campaign has also not enlisted countries and governments friendly to Israel or influential mainstream figures who believe in the two-state solution.

2)     In terms of its image and public relations, most of the BDS campaign is still the field of action of extremist, anti-Zionist fringe networks and figures. However, during the past year, in a number of instances the campaign managed to enter mainstream public discourse and the leading Western media (for example, the argument conducted on the pages of the New York Times[2]). Moreover, during the past year the BDS campaign was given prominence by the Israeli media and political leadership. BDS activists were encouraged by the exaggerated Israeli media coverage, often quoting articles representing the campaign as "an existential threat" or "a strategic threat" to Israel. They leverage them to "prove" that the campaign is successful and effective (BDS activists recently quoted statements by Israeli President Reuven Rivlin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the BDS' threat).

The BNC leverages Israeli media for its propaganda. The front page of the popular Israeli daily newspaper Yedioth Aharonot, whose main headline reads, "The boycott of Israel will get worse" (Bdsmovement.net, January 13, 2015).

8.   In ITIC assessment, the BDS campaign's future effectiveness will depend primarily on the future of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and negotiations. The easing of tensions between Israel and the Palestinians can allow the contradictions between the PA and Fatah on the one hand, and the BDS campaign on the other to surface, and cause the campaign to fadeand remain the province of extremist fringes. On the other hand, the growing tensions between the Israelis and Palestinians, and the continuation of the political and legal campaign the PA is waging against Israel, are liable to blur the distinctions between the PA and the BDS campaign, and to lead the PA to adopt BDS tactics (that is, other initiatives for boycotting Israel in international institutions, such as FIFA). In ITIC assessment the PA's adoption of BDS tactics is liable to make the anti-Israeli campaign more effective.

The Contents of the Report

9.   This report has the following sections:

1)     Introduction: Main Findings

2)     Section One: The BDS Campaign and Its Roots

3)     Section Two: The BNC – Palestinian Umbrella Network Collaborating with the Global BDS Campaign

A.     The circumstances of the BNC's establishment and its participating networks.

B.     The BNC's objectives and its role in the BDS campaign.

C.     III.. The importance of the BNC in the internal Palestinian arena.

D.     The BNC's website, Facebook page and Twitter account.

E.     "The Electronic Intifada," an Internet platform for BNC activists and the BDS campaign.

F.     Funding for BNC activities.

G.    Palestinian networks not participating in the BNC but participating in the campaign to delegitimize Israel.

4)     Section Three: Profiles of the Main Palestinian BNC Activists:

A.     Omar Barghouti

B.     II Michael Deas

C.     Mahmoud Nawaja'

D.     Zied al-Shuaibi

5)     Section Four: Comparison of PA and BDS Campaign Positions

A.     The difference between the PA and BDS campaign positions.

B.     An ideological common denominator.

C.     Mahmoud Abbas' visit to South Africa: exposure of the fundamental differences between the PA and the BDS.

D.     The PA boycott of Israeli products in Judea and Samaria.

E.     The attempt to suspend Israel from FIFA: the PA's possible adoption of BDS tactics.

F.     The role of the Palestinian left: Mustafa Barghouti and the Palestinian National Incentive Movement.

Apartheid The Delegitimization Campaign The West Organizations in the WestThe Israeli-Palestinian Conflict The Palestinian Authority

Full Document in PDF Format

כרזה של קמפיין BDS המופיעה באתר BNC, הועדה הלאומית הפלסטינית בראמאללה, המתיימרת להנהיג את קמפיין BDS העולמי (4 בספטמבר 2014,  אתר BNC bdsmovement.net).

מבוא: עיקרי הממצאים

1.    מסמך זה בוחן את מקומם של פעילים וארגונים פלסטינים ביהודה ושומרון וברצועת עזה בקמפיין BDS נגד ישראל. קמפיין זה, שמקורו בועידת דרבן הראשונה (2001), מתנהל ע"י רשת של פעילים והתארגנויות אנטי-ישראליים ברחבי העולם, בדגש על מדינות המערב, שמקורם בעיקר בשוליים הקיצוניים של השמאל והאסלאם. מטרת הקמפיין היא למתג את ישראל כ"מדינת אפרטהייד" ולקדם חרם בינלאומי עליה, על מוסדותיה, מנהיגיה, כלכלתה, תרבותה ועל אלה המסייעים לה. זאת כדי להביא בסופו של דבר לקריסתה, כפי שקרס משטר האפרטהייד בדרום אפריקה. מארגני הקמפיין מתנגדים לכל הכרה בישראל ומשא ומתן עימה,שוללים את תפיסת שתי המדינות, מדגישים את "זכות השיבה" של הפליטים הפלסטינים לשטח ישראל וחותרים לממש את החזון של מדינה אחת בשליטת הפלסטינים.

2.    פעילים וארגונים פלסטינים בראמאללה הצטרפו לקמפיין BDS בשנת  2005, ארבע שנים לאחר ועידת דרבן. בנובמבר 2007 הקימו פעילים פלסטינים בראמאללה את BNC, ועדה לאומית פלסטינית לקידום קמפיין BDS(BDS National Committee). BNCמורכב כיום מ-27 ארגונים פלסטינים בלתי-ממשלתיים, חלקם ארגונים שיש להם אחיזה בחברה האזרחית הפלסטינית, וחלקם ארגונים קיקיונים או וירטואליים, שאין מאחוריהם ממש.

3.    BNC שותף פעיל לקמפיין  BDS  נגד ישראל. בולטת בו קבוצה קטנה של פעילים פלסטינים, חסרת משקל משמעותי בפוליטיקה הפנים-פלסטינית, אך מקושרת היטב לפעילים המערביים המובילים את קמפיין BDS ברחבי העולם.בקרב קבוצה זו בולטים שני פעילים, שגדלו במדינות המערב ולמדו בהן באוניברסיטאות מובילות. הדמות הפלסטינית המובילה הינה הוא עמר אלברע'ות'י, תועמלן פלסטיני אנטי-ישראלי רהוט, המגדיר עצמו כפעיל זכויות אדם, שהפך ברבות השנים לדמות מפתח בקמפיין BDSבמדינות המערב (בעיקר בארה"ב ובבריטניה). לצידו פועל מיכאל דיס, שהתחנך בבריטניה (בוגר LSE, בית הספר לכלכלה בלונדון), המשמש כיום נציג BNC באירופה ושוהה דרך קבע בבריטניה, מרכז מתקפת הדה-לגיטימציה נגד ישראל (משם הוא יוצא לגיחות למדינות מערב אירופה ולמוסדות האיחוד האירופאי).

4.    BNC מתיימר להנהיג את הקמפיין העולמי של BDS ולטענתו יש לו תמיכה מאסיבית בחברה הפלסטינית. שתי הטענות הללו להערכתנו אינן נכונות ותכליתן להעצים את BNC מעבר למשקלו האמיתי.שכן BNC הפלסטיני אינו מנהיג את קמפיין BDS, המתאפיין במבנה רשתי מבוזר ברחבי העולם, ללא היררכיה ברורה. גם במישור הפוליטי הפנים-פלסטיני אין ל-BNC ולפעיליו אחיזה של ממש בפוליטיקה ובחברה הפלסטינית, בשטחי הרשות הפלסטינית וברצועת עזה. עיקר חשיבותו של BNC הינה, להערכתנו, העובדה שהוא מהווה את "הפנים הפלסטיניות" האוטנטיות לכאורה של קמפיין ולכך יש חשיבות,מנקודת מבטם של פעילים וארגונים אנטי-ישראלים ברחבי העולם, המתיימרים לפעול לקידום "הזכויות הפלסטיניות".

5.    הרשות הפלסטינית ופתחאינם מהווים חלק מקמפיין BDS אך הם רואים בו אמצעי מועיל להפעלת לחצים על ישראל ומנהלים מערכה אנטי-ישראלית נרחבת, הנותנת רוח גבית לפעילות BDS ברחבי העולם. מהבחינה העקרוניתהתגלעו בעבר חילוקי דעות חריפים בין אבו מאזן לבין עמר אלברע'ות'י, הדמות הפלסטינית הבולטת ב-BDS. קמפיין ההחרמות נגד ישראל שהרשות הפלסטינית ופתח מנהלות מתמקד בדרך כלל ביהודה ושומרון והוא כולל חרם על מוצרים ישראלים המיובאים ליהודה ושומרון, החרמת מוצרים המיוצרים בהתנחלויותוהפעלת לחצים דיפלומטיים על מדינות וחברות מאירופה לסמן מוצרים שמקורם בהתנחלויות. בו בזמן הרשות הפלסטינית מאפשרת את פעילותו של BNC מראמאללה ולעיתים אף תומכת בו ומסתייעת בו לצרכי המערכה המדינית, ההסברתית והמשפטית (שהיא מנהלת נגד ישראל). פרשת הקמפיין להשעיית חברות ישראל בפיפ"א עלולה להעיד על סחף בעמדת הרשות לכיוון של אימוץ טקטיקות הלקוחות מקמפיין BDS (פעילים בקמפיין BDSהביעו אכזבה מ"הבגידה בפיפ"א" של הרשות אך הביעו ביטחונם, שהמאמץ לבידודה של ישראל יימשך).

6.    פעילי BNC ופעילי BDS ברחבי העולם מרבים להתהדר בהצלחות הרבות, שנחל הקמפיין. בחינת תוצאות הקמפיין עד כה מעלה, כי קיים פער רב בין תוצאותיו המעשיות לבין הדימוי האימתני שפעיליו מנסים לשוות לו:

א. המישור המעשי: על אף כמה הצלחות "נקודתיות" לא הצליחה עד כה פעילות BDS ברחבי העולם, בדגש על מדינות המערב, לבודד את ישראל ולפגוע באופן משמעותי במוסדותיה, כלכלתה ותרבותה. כמו כן לא הצליח הקמפיין לסחוף לשורותיו מדינות ידידותיות לישראל או אישים משפיעים מהזרם המרכזי, המאמינים בתפיסת שתי המדינות.

ב. במישור התדמיתי: מרבית העיסוק בקמפיין ה-BDS נותר עדיין נחלתם של התארגנויות ואישים אנטי-ציונים מהשוליים הקיצונים. אולם בשנה האחרונה הצליח הקמפיין בכמה מקרים לחדור אל מרכז השיח הציבורי ואל התקשורת המערבית המובילה ולעורר סביבו שיח ציבורי (למשל, התנצחות מעל דפי הניו יורק טיימס האמריקאי^[1]). יתרה מזאת, קמפיין ה-BDS זכה בשנה האחרונה להבלטה רבה בתקשורת הישראלית ובהצהרות מנהיגים ישראלים. פעילי BDS שואבים עידוד רב מהתהודה התקשורתית בישראל ומרבים לצטט פרסומים בהם מוצג ה-BDS כ"איום קיומי" או "איום אסטרטגי" על ישראל. פרסומים אלו ממונפים על ידם ומשמשיםבידיהם "הוכחה" להצלחת הקמפיין ולאפקטיביות שלו (לאחרונה צוטטו ע"י פעילי BDS התבטאויות של נשיא המדינה ראובן רבלין ושל ראש הממשלה בנימין נתניהו אודות האיום הגלום ב-BDS).

מינוף כתבות המתפרסמות בתקשורת הישראלית ע"י  BNC

(13 בינואר 2015, bdsmovement.net)

7.    מידת האפקטיביות של קמפיין BDS בעתיד תהייה תלויה להערכתנו בראש ובראשונה בעתידו של המו"מ הישראלי-פלסטיני. חידוש התהליך המדיני והפחתת המתחים בין ישראל לפלסטינים עשוי להציף את הניגודים הקיימים בין הרשות הפלסטינית ופתח לבין קמפיין BDS ולהביא לדעיכתו של הקמפיין ולהשארתו נחלתם של השוליים הקיצוניים. לעומת זאת, העדרם של הידברות ושל תהליך מדיני, והמשך המערכה המדינית והמשפטית, שמנהלת הרשות הפלסטינית נגד ישראל, עלולים לטשטש ההבדלים שבין הרשות לבין קמפיין BDS ולהביא לאימוץ טקטיקות של BDSע"י הרשות, למשל - יוזמות נוספות להחרמת ישראל במוסדות בינלאומיים כדוגמת השעיית ישראל מחברותה בפיפ"א. אימוץ טקטיקות של קמפיין BDS ע"י הרשות הפלסטינית עלול להערכתנו להפוך אותו לאפקטיבי יותר מאשר היה עד כה.

 http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/he/article/20851

http://www.canarymission.org/

http://tripeilat.blogspot.co.il/2015/07/norman-finkelstein-arguing-bds-campaign.html

Israeli Security Policy in Syria

Institute for Contemporary Affairs

Founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation

Vol. 15, No. 13     April 28, 2015  

• The attempted Hizbullah attack thwarted on the Golan Heights and the air strikes attributed to the Israeli Air Force against military targets in Syria join a series of similar incidents over the past three years.

• Iran and Hizbullah are trying to exploit the control of parts of the Golan and to improve the military capabilities of Hizbullah which is seen as the military arm of Iran. Iran seeks to bring Hizbullah’s threat to Israel to a new level. Hizbullah is reportedly trying to acquire more precise missiles, with longer ranges and heavier warheads, along with anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems. Iran and Hizbullah are seeking to establish an anti-Israel terror infrastructure in the northern Golan.

• Israel purportedly bombed weapons stockpiles in Syria before they were shipped to Lebanon and attacked a convoy of senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizbullah officials on the Golan who were seeking to activate an anti-Israel terror network there.

• Israel does not support either of the two main sides in the Syrian civil war – neither the Iranian-led radical axis, nor the radical Sunni axis led separately by Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.

• Israel provides the Syrian people with humanitarian aid, with an emphasis on medical assistance to the many injured people in the border region.

The attempted Hizbullah attack thwarted in the northern Golan Heights on April 26, 2015, and the air strikes apparently carried out by the Israeli Air Force on April 21 and 24 against military targets in Syria, as reported in Arab media, join a series of similar incidents over the past three years. The attacks purportedly targeted advanced weapons being stored before their transfer to Hizbullah in Lebanon. Attacks were carried out against several targets on the Golan. Apart from isolated cases, Israel has avoided directly responding to reports on the strikes and merely made declarations about its general policy. Syria and Hizbullah, for their part, have generally refrained from addressing the reports publicly and have not mounted a military operation as a direct response to the strikes.

Syrian President Bashar Assad meeting with Iran’s Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei

The attacks and reported air strikes indicate an ongoing battle between Israel and the Iranian-led radical axis to set the rules of the game in Syrian territory. Such rules concern the impact of Syria’s civil war on the severity of the threat that the radical axis can pose to Israel from the north, including Syria and Lebanon.

Hizbullah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war was, to a large extent, imposed upon it against its will. This involvement is exacting a heavy price on the organization in the form of numerous casualties and the need to spread its limited resources over many fronts and missions, along with a considerable political price. Among both Hizbullah’s supporters in Lebanon and, particularly, its antagonists there, the involvement in Syria is making Hizbullah more vulnerable because it creates legitimacy for anti-Lebanese activity by the Sunni radicals, while exacerbating the tension between Hizbullah’s identity, on the one hand, as a Lebanese Shiite organization and, on the other, an organization that is part of the Iranian radical axis and part of the Iranian security apparatus that must act according to the interests and dictates of Iran and Bashar Assad.

The burden created by the involvement in Syria is especially heavy because the pro-Assad radical axis is evidently not about to defeat its opponents. On the contrary, all of its recent attempts to push the opponents back have failed. The axis has even had to give up some of its assets, including control of the city of Idlib in northwestern Syria; the last border crossing with Jordan that it had held until recently; and the important town of Busra al-Sham in the Daraa District.

Moreover, the major offensives the axis declared in the Golan Heights and in Aleppo were nipped in the bud; nor has progress been achieved in the political sphere despite Moscow’s willingness to help the Assad regime. Because Assad and Iran view Hizbullah as the most significant of the forces fighting for the regime’s continued existence, and because all of the members of the radical axis, including Hizbullah, regard the Assad regime’s continued viability as a supreme objective, the organization realizes that its deep involvement in the Syrian civil war is nowhere near its conclusion and will continue to exact a heavy price.

To balance the price they are paying for their deep involvement in protecting Assad, Iran and Hizbullah are working to make the most of the new reality. They do so particularly by exploiting their current dominant position in those parts of Syria that remain under control of Assad with axis support.

First of all, they are trying to exploit the control of territory and the involvement in the fighting to improve the military capabilities of Hizbullah, which is seen as the military arm of Iran, its main purpose being to fight Israel and Iran’s other adversaries in the region. Beyond Hizbullah fighters gaining combat and operational experience, the control of Syrian territory enables Iran and Hizbullah to speed up the flow of advanced weaponry that can bring Hizbullah’s threat to Israel to a new level. According to various reports, Hizbullah is trying to acquire more precise missiles, with longer ranges and heavier warheads, along with anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems, and more. Some of these weapons make their way to Hizbullah from Iran via Syria, and some from Russia via Syria for transfer to Hizbullah by the Syrians.

Second, with Hizbullah avoiding attacks on Israel from Lebanon since the Second Lebanon War owing to its fear of both Israeli and domestic Lebanese responses, Iran and Hizbullah have sought to exploit their status in Syria to impose on Assad a new reality in the Golan Heights, one that enables them to build an anti-Israel terror infrastructure in the northern Golan and to use it according to their considerations exclusively. This contrasts markedly with the situation prevailing in the area since 1975, in which the Syrian regime forbade hostilities from its territory and instead supported attacks from Lebanon. The part of the northern Golan that is under the axis’ control has already been used to stage a number of terror operations.

And finally, Iran and Hizbullah have sought to exploit their involvement in the fighting against Assad’s radical Sunni adversaries in Syria, with an emphasis on Hizbullah’s role in the struggle against those elements along Lebanon’s border with Syria, in an effort to boost the organization’s status as defender of Lebanon. Indeed, its status as Lebanon’s defender against Israel is mired in controversy and has suffered much damage since the Second Lebanon War. Now, though, an opportunity has arisen to portray Hizbullah as defending the country, with all of its population segments, against a new threat that is also perceived as more authentic.

“Rules of the Game”

Israel, of course, views with great concern the first two directions of Iranian and Hizbullah activity – new armaments and establishing a terror center on the Golan — and Israel’s policy toward its northern front aims at stymieing these undertakings. An analysis of the steps taken by Israel so far indicates resolve and persistence while, at the same time, seeking to avoid a wide-scale escalation. Israel is, in fact, attempting to establish rules of the game where it is permitted to act against those two aims of its adversaries, especially so long as it restricts its operations to Syrian territory.

It is in this context that one must understand the recurrent reports about attacks against weapons stockpiles in Syria before they are shipped to Lebanon, along with the claim that it was Israel that, in January this year, attacked a convoy of senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizbullah officials on the Golan who were seeking to activate an anti-Israel terror network there. At this point, such actions delay the building of the terror infrastructure on the Golan and reduce the ability of the radical axis to exploit the situation to bolster Hizbullah combat abilities. These actions also indicate the degree to which the axis’ anti-Israel activities have been exposed and thus enhance Israel’s deterrence. At the same time, it appears that such operations have not sufficed to put a stop to Iranian and Hizbullah’s efforts, which continue constantly.

Although the actions attributed to Israel are indeed carried out in Syrian territory, they do not constitute any change in Israel’s policy of avoiding open intervention or taking sides in the bloody Syrian conflict. Clearly, Israel does not support either of the two main sides in the civil war – the Iranian-led radical axis and the radical Sunni axis led separately by Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.

At the same time, Israel is not indifferent to what happens on the other side of the border. It supports the suffering Syrian people with humanitarian aid, with an emphasis on medical assistance to the many injured people in the border region, and hopes for the strengthening of the moderate elements among the regime’s opponents, who represent a very large part of the Syrian population but suffer from military and organizational weakness in comparison to their adversaries.

http://jcpa.org/article/israeli-security-policy-in-syria/

http://www.canarymission.org/